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How do we make simple purchasing decisions (e.g., whether or not to buy a product at
a given price)? Previous work has shown that the attentional drift-diffusion model (aDDM)
can provide accurate quantitative descriptions of the psychometric data for binary and
trinary value-based choices, and of how the choice process is guided by visual atten-
tion. Here we extend the aDDM to the case of purchasing decisions, and test it using
an eye-tracking experiment. We find that the model also provides a reasonably accurate
quantitative description of the relationship between choice, reaction time, and visual fix-
ations using parameters that are very similar to those that best fit the previous data. The
only critical difference is that the choice biases induced by the fixations are about half as
big in purchasing decisions as in binary choices.This suggests that a similar computational
process is used to make binary choices, trinary choices, and simple purchasing decisions.
Keywords: drift-diffusion, decision-making, neuroeonomics, decision neuroscience, eye-tracking, valuation, choice,
purchasing
INTRODUCTION
A basic goal of decision neuroscience and neuroeconomics is to
characterize the computations carried out by the brain to make
different types of decisions (Busemeyer and Johnson, 2004; Smith
and Ratcliff, 2004; Bogacz, 2007; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Rangel
et al., 2008; Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Hare and Rangel, 2010;
Rushworth et al., 2011). Over the last decade, a sizable number of
studies have found that standard drift-diffusion-models (DDM;
Ratcliff, 1978, 2002; Busemeyer and Rapoport, 1988; Ratcliff and
McKoon,1997,2008;Ratcliff andRouder,2000;Ratcliff andSmith,
2004; Leite and Ratcliff, 2010), as well as closely related versions
such as the leaky competing accumulator (LCA)model (Usher and
McClelland, 2001; Smith and Ratcliff, 2004; Tsetsos et al., 2011)
provide quantitative explanations of the psychometrics, chrono-
metrics, and neurometrics of perceptual choices. More recently,
it has been shown that these models also provide good accounts
of value-based choice (Basten et al., 2010; Krajbich et al., 2010;
Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Philiastides et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2011;
Krajbich and Rangel, 2011).
This class of models assumes that decisions are made by accu-
mulating noisy evidence in favor of the different options. The
combined evidence for each option is compared to that for the
other options, and when the relative evidence for any option
exceeds a pre-defined threshold, that option is chosen. One can
think of the relative evidence signals as measures of the individ-
ual’s confidence that each option is the correct choice, and thus
the model implies that choices are made only when the subject
is confident enough. For perceptual discrimination, the source
of the noisy evidence comes from the stimulus itself. For value-
based decision-making, the noisy evidence derives from how item
values are computed and compared. Note, in particular, that the
decision process involves the sequential and repeated sampling of
the attractiveness of each option’s individual attributes or char-
acteristics. This introduces two sources of noise in the process:
noise intrinsic to the sampling of attribute values, and noise due
to random shifts in attention between the options which affect
how the attribute values are sampled (Busemeyer and Townsend,
1993; Diederich, 1997; Roe et al., 2001; Busemeyer and Diederich,
2002; Usher andMcClelland, 2004; Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005;
Usher et al., 2008; Tsetsos et al., 2010).
In previous work we have shown that a variant of the DDM,
whichwe refer to as the attentional drift-diffusionmodel (aDDM),
provides quantitatively accurate predictions of the relationship
between choices, reaction times, and visual fixations in experi-
ments where subjects make either binary or trinary snack food
choices (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). A criti-
cal feature of the aDDM is that the evidence accumulation process
depends on where the subject is looking, so that on average a
subject accumulates more evidence for an item when it is being
looked at than when it is not. A fitting of the model to the data
found that subjects only accumulate about a third as much evi-
dence for an item when it is not being looked at. This difference in
the accumulation rate has important implications for the pattern
and quality of decisions: choices are biased by their fixation pat-
terns, i.e., the more time a subject spends looking at an appetitive
item, the more likely he is to choose it. Importantly, in our previ-
ous work we found that a single model with common parameters
was able to account for the data in both binary and trinary food
choices, which suggests that the underlying processes exhibit some
robustness.
This study seeks to advance our understanding of the prop-
erties, advantages, and limitations of the aDDM by investigating
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if it can also provide an accurate description of purchasing deci-
sions, and the extent to which the model’s parameters need to
change to explain this new class of decisions. In the simple pur-
chasing decisions studied here, subjects see a product and a price,
and have to decide whether or not to buy the item at that price.
This type of decision is interesting because the subject needs to
combine information from two very different types of stimuli:
real world or rich pictorial representations (e.g., pictures of snack
food) and symbolic/numerical information (i.e., the price tag). It
is not obvious a priori if the aDDM will be able to account for the
data in simple purchasing decisions,or if changes in the underlying
model parameters will be required. For example, since the price is
presented in numerical form, it is not obvious if the price infor-
mation integrates dynamically and stochastically as in the DDM,
or if in contrast it is incorporated using a more deterministic
algorithm.
We present a computational model of the aDDM applied
to simple purchasing decisions, and data from an eye-tracking
experiment designed to address the following questions. First,
how do subjects allocate fixation time between products and
prices? Second, to what extent, if any, do visual fixations influ-
ence choices? Third, can the aDDM explain purchasing decisions
with reasonable quantitative accuracy?
COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
In previous work we have proposed and tested a model of how
visual fixations interact with the choice process to make choices
between pairs of stimuli (e.g., apple or orange?; Krajbich et al.,
2010). We refer to that model as the aDDM. Here we show that
a simple parameter change in the model is also able to provide a
good quantitative account of simple purchasing decisions.
In a simple purchasing decision, a subject is shown a product
and a price, and has to decide whether or not he wants to purchase
it at that price. Economists typically assume that an individual
knows his value for a good, i.e., the amount that he is willing
to pay for it in dollars. In this case the optimal strategy involves
purchasing the item when its net value is greater than zero, and
not purchasing the item otherwise. Net value is defined as the
difference between the item’s value and its price.
In contrast, the aDDM assumes that every purchasing deci-
sion involves the dynamic computation of a relative decision value
(RDV) variable, which starts at zero at the beginning of each deci-
sion, and evolves over time until a choice is made (see Figure 1A
for a graphical illustration). At any instant t within the decision
process, the RDV variable (denoted by Vt) measures the current
estimate of the relative value of purchasing the item minus the
value of not purchasing it. The RDV evolves as aMarkov Gaussian
process until it reaches a barrier located at either +1 or −1. If it
crosses the +1 barrier then the item is purchased, if it crosses the
−1 barrier the item is not purchased.
A critical feature of the aDDM is that the mean rate of change
(drift rate) of the RDV depends on the fixation location at that
instant in time (as illustrated in Figure 1A). In particular, when
the subject is looking at the item, the evolution of the RDV is
given by
Vt = Vt−1 + d
(
v − θp) + εt
and when he is looking at the price, it is given by
Vt = Vt−1 − d
(
p − θv) + εt
whereVt is the value of the RDV at time t within the decision trial,
v denotes the subject’s value for the product being considered for
purchase, p denotes the price of the purchase, d is a constant con-
trolling the speed of integration (in units of $−1ms−1), θ between
0 and 1 is a parameter reflecting the bias toward the fixated option,
and ε is white Gaussian noise with variance σ2 (randomly sampled
once every ms). Note that at any point in a trial the RDV is evolv-
ing according to one of these two drift rates, depending on where
the subject is looking.When the subject shifts his gaze to the other
option, the RDV continues to evolve from its current value, but
with the other drift rate.
The model assumes that fixations are generated by a stochas-
tic process that is independent of the value of the path that the
RDV takes during the trial. Note that this does not rule out the
possibility that the fixation process could be affected by the latent
value of the product or by the price. In fact, as is described in the
methods section below, all of our analyses assume that fixation
locations and durations are drawn from the observed empirical
distribution, and that the integration process within each fixa-
tion continues until the end of the fixation, in which case another
fixation is drawn, or until a barrier is crossed, in which case the
trial ends. This approach allows us to investigate the comparator
process in detail, while taking the fixation process as exogenously
given.
Several features of the model are worth highlighting. First, the
model has three free parameters: the bias parameter θ, the slope
parameter d, and the noise parameter σ. As discussed below and
in our previous work (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel,
2011) changes in the value of these parameters have important
qualitative and quantitative implications for the accuracy and
speed of choice. Second, the variables v and p reflect properties of
the stimuli being considered, and thus are not parameters of the
decision process. In particular, the experimental design described
below allows us to measure v and p for each subject and trial
independently of the actual purchase decisions, and this informa-
tion is used to estimate the free parameters of the aDDM. Third,
the model includes the standard DDM, in which fixations do not
matter, as a special case when θ= 1 (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008;
Milosavljevic et al., 2010). Fourth, the model is almost identical
to the one that we have previously proposed for binary choice
(Krajbich et al., 2010), except for a slight change in the nature
of the stimuli and responses. In particular, in our previous work
subjects were shown pictures of two food items, one of the left
and one on the right, and they had to choose one of them with a
button press. In contrast, here subjects were shown a more com-
plex screen consisting of a picture of an item and a price, and had
to indicate with a button press whether they wanted to buy the
item at that price. Fifth, when θ< 1 the model predicts that ran-
dom fluctuations in fixations affect choices. In particular, items
are more likely to be purchased when subjects fixate more on the
product relative to the price, and less likely to be bought when
they fixate relatively more on the price. The intuition is simple
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FIGURE 1 | Model and experiment. (A) Model. A relative decision value
(RDV) evolves over time with a slope that depends on what the subject is
looking at. In addition to the average drift, there is also Gaussian noise.When
the RDV reaches one of the two barriers the subject makes the corresponding
choice. The shaded regions indicate what the subject is currently looking at,
blue for the product and yellow for the price. (B)Timeline. (Top) Subjects first
reveal how much they are willing to pay for each of the 50 products, using a
BDM auction. Then subjects make 300 purchasing choices (the 50 products at
six different prices). At the end of the experiment one trial from the combined
tasks is randomly chosen and the subject is paid and/or is shipped the chosen
product. (Bottom)Within a choice trial, subjects must first fixate at the center
of the screen for 2 s. They are then presented with an item and a price and
given unlimited self-paced time to decide whether to buy the item at that
price.
and can be easily seen from the two equations above. During fix-
ations on the item, the RDV evolves with an average rate that
underestimates the size of the price, which entails a temporary
overestimation of the net value, and makes it more likely that the
“purchase barrier” is reached. The opposite is true during price
fixations.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Thirty Caltech students participated in the experiment. Subjects
received $50 for their participation, which they either kept or used
to purchase items using the task described below. Caltech’sHuman
Subjects Internal Review Board approved the experiment. Subjects
provided informed consent prior to their participation.
TASK
At the beginning of the experiment subjects were endowed with
$50 that they could use to purchase items in two subsequent
tasks: a bidding task followed by a purchasing task. The subjects
were told that at the end of the experiment one trial from the
whole experiment would be randomly selected and implemented.
Subjects kept whatever funds they did not spend.
Every subject performed two different tasks in the same order.
First, they carried out a bidding task designed to measure the val-
ues (i.e., the v in themodel) for each product. Second, they carried
out a purchasing task that provides the data used to test the aDDM.
In the bidding task, subjects placed bids for the right to pur-
chase 50 different consumer goods including mostly consumer
electronics and household items. The task followed the rules of a
Becker–Degroot–Marshak (BDM) auction, which is a tool widely
used in economics to incentivize subjects to reveal their true values
for products (Becker et al., 1964). In brief, a subject is asked to state
their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for each of the products. If one of
these trials is randomly selected to count, then the experimenter
generates a random selling price (from a known uniform distri-
bution from $0 to $50). If the random selling price is less than
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or equal to the subject’s stated WTP, then the subject purchases
the product at the random price and keeps the rest of the $50. If
the selling price is greater than the subject’s WTP, then the sub-
ject does not purchase the product and keeps the entire $50. Note
that the subject cannot influence the price that they pay for the
product. They can only indicate whether they would be willing to
buy at different prices. Thus, their unique best strategy is to state
their true WTP. The order of item presentation was randomized
for each subject. Each trial, subjects had unlimited time to exam-
ine a high-resolution photograph of the item along with a brief
written description of the product on the computer screen and
then submit a WTP from $0 to $50 by typing their bid.
The purchasing task is depicted in Figure 1B. Every trial sub-
jects decided whether to buy the shown item at the stated price, or
to keep their entire $50. On half of the trials the product was dis-
played on the top half of the screen with the price on the bottom
half of the screen, while on the other half of the trials the loca-
tions were switched. Subjects had unlimited time to fixate back
and forth between the product and price before indicating their
choice to purchase (left arrow) or not purchase (right arrow). All
50 items were randomly presented six times, each time coupled
with one of the following six prices: $3, $10, $18, $25, $33, $40.
These prices were selected based on piloting data to span themean
WTPs for most items.
At the end of the experiment if one of these trials was randomly
selected, then the subject was entitled to receive the product for
that trial, and if purchased, we immediately ordered and mailed
the product to the subject. The remaining money (up to $50) was
immediately paid to the subject in cash.
EYE-TRACKING
Subjects’ eye movements were recorded at 50Hz using a Tobii
desktop-mounted eye-tracker. Before each choice trial subjects
were required to maintain a fixation at the center of the screen
for 2 s before the stimuli would appear. This ensured that subjects
began every trial fixating on the same location.
The eye-tracking data were preprocessed using the same pro-
cedure as in our previous work (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich
and Rangel, 2011). In particular, square regions of interest (ROI)
were constructed around the product and price. A fixation was
defined as the time from when at least one eye entered the ROI to
the moment when both eyes left the ROI. For all measurements
following the first fixation and preceding the last fixation of the
trial, non-ROI fixations were dealt with according to the following
rules:
(1) If the non-ROI fixations were recorded between fixations on
the same ROI, then those non-ROI fixations were changed
to that ROI. So for example a fixation pattern of “Prod-
uct,” “Blank,” “Product” would become “Product,” “Product,”
“Product.” These non-ROI fixations are typically very short
and are likely due to blinks.
(2) If the blank fixations were recorded between fixations on
different ROIs, then those blank fixations were recorded as
non-decision time and discarded from further analysis. Again,
these non-ROI fixations are typically just one eye-tracker
measurement (20ms) and due to transitions between ROIs.
DATA CLEANING
Two types of trials were excluded from further analysis. First, for
every subject, we excluded trials with items that received a bid of
exactly $0 in the first task. These trials are problematic because
there are an unusually large number of them (29%) compared to
items with small but positive values ($1, $2, $3, etc.) which sug-
gests that these items are being treated differently by the subjects.
This could be the case, for example, if these are items that they
already own and thus are not seriously considering purchasing. In
this case such items could not be used to study the aDDM since
they do not involve purchasing decisions. Nevertheless, including
these trials does not qualitatively change any of the results.
Second, trials with a net value smaller than −$20, or larger
than $20, were also excluded (an additional 28% of trials). These
choices are extremely easy for the subjects and so not of particu-
lar interest to us. It is only in the −$20 to $20 range that choices
are difficult and the aDDMmakes interesting predictions. Beyond
these net values, subjects are close to 100% accurate and the choice
probabilities and reaction times asymptote. Because we were not
interested inmodeling these very easy choices,we designed the task
to minimize trials in this range and so the data in these regions
look noisy (due to missing observations) and uninteresting. Addi-
tionally, the bins outside this range are scarcely populated, which
interferes with our ability to estimate the aDDM accurately.
In principle, this issue could have been avoided through exper-
imental design by choosing prices in the purchasing task close to
the values reported in the BDM task. Unfortunately, this is not a
feasible solution, because it invalidates the incentive compatibility
of the BDM procedure: subjects would have an incentive to bid
low amounts in order to ensure low prices in the purchasing task.
MODEL SIMULATIONS AND FITTING
The model was fit to the choice and reaction time data using only
the even numbered trials of the pooled data set from all the sub-
jects.We then tested the quality of themodel fit and predictions by
simulating the model using the fitted parameters, and comparing
themwith the actual data from the odd trials. Thus, the predictions
of the model are tested quantitatively and out-of-sample.
The model was fit using a maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) procedure implemented in several steps. First, we ran 3000
simulations for each combination of the model parameters in the
grid described below, the six different prices, and the product
values (sampled in $2 increments from $0 to $50). In the sim-
ulations we randomly sampled fixation times from the empirical
distribution conditional on their fixation type (product or price).
First-fixation price fixations were sampled separately from the rest
of the price fixations because they are statistically shorter than
non-first price fixations. Item fixations were sampled conditional
on their fixation number (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or later), and binned
on the absolute net value (|v− p|, in $4 increments). We also used
the empirical fact that subjects looked at the item first 53.3% of
the time. We also took account of the latency for the first fixation,
as well as for the transition time between fixations. We did this by
computing the difference between the average reaction time and
the average total fixation time (time spent looking at either the
product or the price), and adding this trial-independent estimate
to the simulated reaction times. This average “non-decision” time
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was 336ms, consistent with non-decision times in our previous
work (355ms in Krajbich et al., 2010) and in other DDM studies
of binary choice (365ms in Milosavljevic et al., 2010 and 338ms
in Ratcliff, 2002, for example).
Second,we computed the probability of each observation in the
data, for each set of parameters, as follows. The empirical spread
of reaction times ranged from 495ms to 47.1 s so in the fitting pro-
cedure we discarded any simulation trials below 400ms or above
48 s. The rest of the reaction times were separated into bins of
400ms except for the final bin, which went from 4800ms to 48 s.
For each net value bin ($4 increments), we split the data into buy
and no-buy trials, then for each group counted the number of data
trials in each reaction time bin, and similarly calculated the prob-
ability of a simulation trial occurring in each reaction time bin.
Note that the first two steps are necessary to compute the likeli-
hood function of the data because there is no known closed-form
solution for the aDDM.
Third, we identified the set of parameters that maximized the
log-likelihood of the data by taking the logarithms of each of these
probabilities and summing them up. The resulting number is used
to assess how well the model fit the data, with larger numbers
(closer to zero) indicating better fits. The search was performed
over a grid of values for d, σ, and θ. The MLE search was carried
out in two steps. First we searched over a coarse grid with d in
(0.00006, 0.000065, 0.00007), σ in (0.0228, 0.0237, 0.0247), and θ
in (0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99). Second, we used the results from the first
search to define a narrower search with d in (0.00006, 0.000065), σ
in (0.0218, 0.0228, 0.0237), and θ in (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8). The initial
parameters were chosen based on comparisons to our previous
results (Krajbich et al., 2010). The best-fitting parameters at this
stage were d = 0.000065, σ= 0.02275, and θ= 0.7.
The previous procedure assumes that there is nomotor latency,
namely that the subject enters his choice instantaneously once the
RDV crosses a barrier. To address this problem, we carried out the
following additional step in the model fitting process. We simu-
lated the model with the best MLE parameters described above,
and then compared the average duration of the final fixations with
those from the actual data. Note that this comparison is impor-
tant because, to the extent that subjects maintain fixation during
the motor latency period, our measured durations for final fixa-
tions include the actual duration of the fixation and the motor
latency. Consistent with this concern, our predicted final fixation
durations were on average 73ms shorter than actual measured fix-
ations. Taking this value as the mean motor latency, we redid the
model fitting procedurewith the added feature that there is a 73ms
delay after the decision is made. As before, we began with a coarse
grid search, this time with d in (0.00006, 0.000065, 0.00007), σ in
(0.0228, 0.0237, 0.0247), and θ in (0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9). Second, we
used the results from the first search to define a narrower search
with d in (0.000065),σ in (0.0218, 0.0228, 0.0233, 0.0237), and θ in
(0.6, 0.65, 0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.9). The reportedmodel fits below include
the motor latency correction, which is also used in all simulations
reported in the paper.
GOODNESS-OF-FIT CALCULATIONS
For Figures 2B,C, and 5 we could not compute χ2 goodness-of-fit
statistics because the dependent variables are not binary. Instead
we devised the following alternative goodness-of-fit statistic: (1)
for each bin of the independent variable we “correct” the depen-
dent variable by subtracting the average simulated value from each
subject’s average value. (2) We then run a weighted least-squares
(WLS) regression with the “corrected” dependent variable. The
weights in the regression are equal to the inverse of the variance.
Note that if the simulations fit the data well, then the “corrected”
data should be a flat line at 0. On the other hand, if the simula-
tion fits poorly, then theWLS coefficients should be non-zero. So,
for goodness-of-fits, we report the p-values for the coefficients of
these WLS regressions. If the p-values are less than 0.05 then we
reject that the model accurately fits the data.
RESULTS
MODEL FIT
We fitted the model to the even numbered trials from the group
data usingMLE. Themodel has three free parameters: the constant
determining the speed of integration d, the discount parameter θ,
and thenoise parameterσ. Themodelwasfitunder the assumption
that time evolves in 1ms discrete steps.We selected the parameters
that maximized the probability of the observed choices and reac-
tion times, conditional on the net value of the offer (see Materials
and Methods for details). The best-fitting model had parameters
d = 0.000065 $−1ms−1, σ= 0.0233, and θ= 0.7.
For comparison purposes, in our previous work on binary and
trinary choice we found that the parameters d = 0.0002ms−1,
σ= 0.02, and θ= 0.3 provided the best fit for the data (Krajbich
et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). Since these parameters
were fitted using methods very similar to those used here, their
comparison provides some insight about the computational dif-
ferences between binary choices and yes-no purchasing decisions.
Consider some of the most salient relationships. First, we found
that the noise parameter σ was nearly identical in the two cases,
which suggests a similar amount of computational noise in both
problems. Second, we found that the slope parameter d was about
1/3 smaller in the current data set. This difference needs to be
interpreted with caution, however, because the slope depends on
the scale with which values are measured. In particular, multiply-
ing the net values by a constant a results in a new fit that decreases
d by a factor of 1/a, and leaves the fits of the other two parameters
unchanged. The difference is then easily explained by the fact that
values in our previous paper were measured using liking-rating
differences that ranged from −5 to +5, whereas here the value dif-
ferences ranged from −20 to +20. Third, the bias is significantly
smaller than in our previous work: θ= 0.7 vs. θ= 0.3 previously
(recall that θ= 1 is the case of no bias, so that as theta increases
from 0 to 1 the size of the bias goes down). Nevertheless, as we
will see inmore detail below,with θ= 0.7 there is still a non-trivial
effect of visual fixations on the choice process.
MODEL SIMULATION
In order to investigate the ability of the model to predict the data
quantitatively,we then simulated themodel 10,000 times per value
and price combination (binning values every $2), using the esti-
mated maximum likelihood parameters, and by sampling fixation
lengths from the actual empirical fixation data (see Materials and
Methods for details). Throughout,we assume that fixations always
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FIGURE 2 | Basic psychometrics. (A) Probability of purchasing the
product as a function of the net value (product value – price). (B)
Reaction times as a function of the magnitude of the net value. (C)
The number of fixations in a trial, as a function of the magnitude of
the net value. Black circles indicate data from the odd-numbered
trials of the subject data, and red dashed lines indicate the
simulated data from the aDDM. Bars are standard error bars,
clustered by subject.
alternate between the product and price, and that the location of
the first fixation is chosen probabilistically to match the empirical
data (look at the product first with probability 53.3%). The results
of the simulations are described below.
Note that all comparisons of the model to the data were made
out-of-sample using only on the odd-numbered trials, since the
model was fitted to the even-numbered trials. Also, in all of the
figures below red curves represent the simulations, and black
symbols and curves represent the data.
Unless otherwise noted, throughout the results, goodness-of-fit
p-values are based on two-sided t -tests of the regression para-
meters against zero (see Materials and Methods for goodness-
of-fit details), and p-values for trends in the subject data are
based on two-sided t -tests of themixed-effects regression parame-
ters against zero. Each mixed-effects regression contains random
effects for the intercept and all other regressors.
BASIC PSYCHOMETRICS
In this section we investigate how well the aDDM predicted the
choice and reaction time data on the half of the data that it was not
fitted to, and additionally estimate the effects of choice difficulty
on average reaction times and number of fixations. Our measure
of choice difficulty is the absolute (unsigned) net value, which tells
us the difference in value between the item and the price.With this
measure, the hardest decision is onewhere the item value and price
are identical, leading to a net value of $0.
The fitted model accounted for the choice and reaction time
curveswell. Choiceswere a logistic functionof net value in both the
data and the simulations (Figure 2A; χ2 goodness-of-fit: p = 0.8).
As expected, subjects were more likely to purchase on trials with
a positive net value and less likely to purchase on trials with a
negative net value.
Reaction times significantly increased with difficulty at an aver-
age rate of 42ms/$ (p< 10−10 mixed-effects) and the aDDM also
provided a close fit to the data (Figure 2B; goodness-of-fit slope:
p = 0.9, intercept: p = 0.7).
The average number of fixations in a trial exhibits a small but
significant (p< 10−5 mixed-effects) response to increasing diffi-
culty at a rate of 0.016 fixations/$, though the aDDMdoes not fit as
well here (Figure 2C; goodness-of-fit slope: p = 0.0005, intercept:
p = 10−13). Even after correcting for the difference in scale, the
size of effect is about 1/3 of the one that we previously observed
with choices between food items (Krajbich et al., 2010).
As shown in Figure 2C, the model systematically predicts 0.7
excess fixations. This mismatch has been consistently observed
with the aDDM (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011),
is an unavoidable consequence of the procedures used to carry
out the simulations, and does not reflect an inherent limitation
of the model. In fact, this bias is present even if one simulates a
dataset using the aDDM, and then carries out the model fitting
exercise on the simulated data. More concretely, the problem is
due to the fact that we have to sample fixations from the empirical
distribution of non-final fixations, but many of those fixations are
cut short by a barrier crossing and become final fixations in the
simulations. The longer the fixation, the more likely it is to cross
a barrier, and so the average middle fixation duration is shorter
in the simulations; this means that more fixations are required to
achieve the same reaction times in our simulations as in the actual
data. Nevertheless, the mismatch is larger here than previously
observed and the aDDM also over-estimates the effect of difficulty
on the number of fixations, though the difference is quite small
(0.03 fixations/$).
MODEL PREDICTIONS AND CHOICE BIASES
The model with θ= 0.7 makes several stark predictions about the
relationship between fixations, choices, and reaction times that we
test using the eye-tracking data.
First, themodel predicts that the last fixation of the trial ismore
likely to be to the product when the subject decides to purchase
it, unless the BDM value of the item is sufficiently smaller than
the price. It also predicts that the last fixation is likely to be to the
price when the subject decides not to purchase the item, unless the
price is sufficiently lower than the value of the product. To see the
intuition for this effect, consider the case in which the last fixa-
tion is to the product. In this case, the RDV tends to climb toward
the purchase barrier, unless the value of the item is smaller than
θ ∗ p. Figure 3A looks at the probability that the last fixation is to
the chosen item (product= purchase or price= no purchase) as a
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FIGURE 3 | Model predictions and results. (A)The probability that the last
fixation of the trial is to the chosen stimulus (product or money) as a function
of the difference in value between the last-seen stimulus and the other
stimulus. (B)The probability of purchasing the item as a function of net value,
contingent on whether the last fixation was to the product or to the price.
Black circles indicate data from the odd-numbered trials of the subject data,
and red dashed lines indicate the simulated data from the aDDM. Bars are
standard error bars, clustered by subject.
function of the difference in value between the last-seen stimulus
and the other stimulus. The figure shows that a small but notice-
able bias of this type is present in both the data and the simulations
(χ2 goodness-of-fit: p = 0.4).
For an additional test of the prediction that there is an overall
bias toward choosing the item that is looked at last, we ran a logit
regression using the entire dataset and variables in Figure 3A to
test whether the intercept was greater than 0. The logit confirmed
that indeed the intercept was greater than 0 (p = 0.03 based on
a one-sided t -test on the entire dataset), indicating that for a net
value of $0, the probability of choosing the item that is looked
at last is significantly greater than 0.5. We also ran an additional
version of this analysis with a different logit regression for each
subject and found that the average intercept was marginally sig-
nificantly greater than zero (p = 0.07 one-sided t -test), providing
further evidence for this effect.
Second, the model predicts that the choice curves should be
different for trials where the last fixation was to the product or
to the price. Specifically, it predicts that subjects should be more
likely to purchase the item if the last fixation was to the product
than if it was to the price. This follows directly from the fact that
with θ< 1, the net value of the trade is overestimatedwhenfixating
on the product, and underestimated when fixating on the price.
This effect is small but noticeable in both the simulations and
the data (Figure 3B; χ2 goodness-of-fit item seen last: p = 0.01,
price seen last: p = 0.3). To test the significance of this effect in
the data, we ran two logistic regressions on the entire dataset and
variables from Figure 3B, one for trials where the product was
seen last and one for trials where the price was seen last. For trials
where the product was seen last the logit intercept was signifi-
cantly greater than zero (p = 0.03 one-sided t -test) while for trials
where the price was seen last the logit intercept was significantly
less than zero (p = 0.05 one-sided t -test). Subject-level analyses
were inconclusive (p = 0.53), likely due to many cases of perfect
separation and small numbers of observations for other subjects
in some of the bins.
Third, the model predicts that more time spent looking at the
product over the course of the trial will bias subjects toward pur-
chasing the good, and that is what we see in the data (Figure 4A;
χ2 goodness-of-fit: p = 0.4).Here the total fixation time advantage
for the item is just the total amount of time spent looking at the
item minus the total amount of time spent looking at the price,
in that trial. One important concern with this result has to do
with the exogeneity of the fixation lengths. In particular, it could
be that the choice bias shown in Figure 4A is due to a positive
relationship between the total fixation time advantage for the item
and the net value. To address this concern we ran a mixed-effects
logit regression including net value and total fixation time advan-
tage for the item as independent variables and purchasing as the
dependent variable. The effect of the total fixation time advan-
tage was highly significant (p< 10−6), ruling out this alternative
explanation. Furthermore, a regression of the total fixation time
advantage for the item on net value shows no significant relation-
ship (5.2ms/$, p = 0.09 mixed-effects linear regression, two-sided
t -test).
An alternative way to investigate this effect is to split trials based
on whether the subject spent more time looking at the product or
the price.As expected, controlling for net value, subjectsweremore
likely to purchase the product if they spent more time looking at
it than if they spent more time looking at the price (Figure 4B).
To test for a significant difference between these curves, we ran
two logistic regressions (analogous to the analysis for Figure 3B)
on the entire dataset and variables in Figure 4B, one for trials
where the product was looked at more and one for trials where
the price was looked at more. For trials where the subjects looked
longer at the product, the logit intercept was significantly greater
than zero (p< 0.01 one-sided t -test) while for trials where the
subjects looked longer at the price, the logit intercept was signifi-
cantly less than zero (p = 0.02 one-sided t -test). As a further test,
we ran identical subject-level logits and again found a significant
difference between the intercepts for trials where the product was
looked at more and the intercepts for trials where the price was
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looked at more (p = 0.03, one-sided paired t -test; 10 subjects were
excluded due to perfect separation).
Finally, the model also predicts a precise quantitative rela-
tionship between reaction times and net values, as a func-
tion of the type of decision made. As shown in Figure 5, the
model provides a fairly good description of the associated pat-
terns (Figure 5A goodness-of-fit slope: p = 0.5, intercept: p = 0.8;
Figure 5B goodness-of-fit slope:p = 0.11, intercept: p = 0.12). The
intuition behind these patterns goes as follows. In this experiment,
we candefine amistake as either a trial where the subject purchased
an item with a negative net value or a trial where the subject didn’t
purchase an item with a positive net value. With θ< 1, mistakes
tend to occur when the subject has spent more time looking at the
worse option. Therefore,mistakes take longer than correct choices
because the average drift rate when the subject is looking at the
worse item is always smaller than when the subject is looking at
the better item, and a smaller drift rate requires more time for the
RDV to reach the choice barrier. Furthermore, the bigger the mis-
take, the longer the decision should take, up to a point. There is a
counteracting force, which is that big mistakes shouldn’t happen
and so if the subject takes some time to make his decision then
he won’t make these big mistakes. In other words, given a reason-
able amount of time, the overwhelming average drift rate in favor
of the correct option should overwhelm the noise in the decision
process. Therefore, big mistakes must occur due to large spikes in
the noise, and these spikesmust occur early in the trial before there
is overwhelming evidence for the correct choice.Without a formal
model it would be unclear at what point these two counteracting
forces should shift in power, but our model predicts the trend in
the data quite accurately.
FIGURE 4 | Choice biases. (A)The probability of purchasing the item as a
function of the difference in total fixation time (over the whole trial) between
the product and the price. Black circles indicate data from the odd-numbered
trials of the subject data, and the red dashed line indicates the simulated data
from the aDDM.The p-value is from a one-sided t -test. (B)The probability that
the product is chosen as a function of the net value, conditional on whether
more time was spent looking at the product or the price in that trial. Bars are
standard error bars, clustered by subject.
FIGURE 5 | Reaction times conditional on choice. (A) Reaction times as a
function of the net value, conditional on purchasing the product. (B) Reaction
times as a function of the net value, conditional on not purchasing the
product. Black bars indicate data from the odd-numbered trials of the subject
data, and the red dashed lines indicate the simulated data from the aDDM.
Bars are standard error bars, clustered by subject.
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FIXATION PROPERTIES
Finally, we investigate the extent to which the fixation process
resembles the assumptions and predictions of the model. To do so
we look at the first fixations of each trial, as well as the “middle
fixations” which are any fixations that are not the first fixation or
the last fixation of the trial. We treat the last fixations of the trials
separately since in the model these fixations are cut short by the
choice.
Consistent with previous findings on choice between prod-
ucts, we found no significant correlation between product value
and mean fixation duration for either first fixations or mid-
dle fixations. There was a small effect of price and a large
effect of choice difficulty on middle item mean fixation duration
(Figures 6A–C, price: 10ms/$, p = 0.02, product value: 6.7ms/$,
p = 0.3, net value: −35ms/$, p< 10−6, two-sided t -tests based
on a mixed-effects regression with all three factors). However, we
found no such effect for middle price fixations (Figures 6D–F,
price: 0.85ms/$, p = 0.08; product value: −0.018ms/$, p = 0.98;
net value: −1.38ms/$, p = 0.08, two-sided t -tests based on a
mixed-effects regression with all three factors), or for first fixa-
tions to either products (price: 0.089ms/$, p = 0.9; product value:
0.37ms/$, p = 0.5; net value: −0.9ms/$, p = 0.2, two-sided t -
tests based on a mixed-effects regression with all three factors)
or prices (price: 0.11ms/$, p = 0.8; product value: 0.71ms/$;
p = 0.2, net value: −0.51ms/$, p = 0.5, two-sided t -tests based
on a mixed-effects regression with all three factors).
Consistent with the predictions of the model, and with previ-
ous findings (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011), we
also found that first and last fixations were significantly shorter
than middle fixations both for products (first: p = 10−7, last:
p = 0.0001, two-sided paired t -tests) and prices (first: p = 10−5,
last: p = 0.03, two-sided paired t -tests; Figure 7A). Our model
does not predict the first fixation effect, but we have seen it con-
sistently in all of our previous related studies. The model does
predict shorter final fixations, since final fixations are just middle
fixations cut short by the RDV crossing a decision barrier.
Figure 7B compares the distribution of price and product total
fixation times, i.e., summed over the whole trial. The distribution
of total fixation times for items has a larger mean and standard
deviation than that for prices (items:M= 1064ms, SD= 1266ms;
prices: M= 471ms, SD= 390ms;M : p = 10−8, SD: p = 10−7; sta-
tistics computed first at the individual level, and then compared
across individuals using paired t -tests).
Finally, Figure 7C shows the average number of item fixations
and price fixations per trial. We see that both types of fixations
follow the same trend as seen in the aggregate Figure 2C, but there
are consistently about 0.5 fewer price fixations than item fixations.
However, this result is not surprising, given that item fixations are
longer than price fixations and so are more likely to be the last fix-
ation of the trial. For trials with an even number of fixations there
is always an equal number of fixations to item and price, regardless
of the last fixation location. But for trials with an odd number of
fixations there will always be one more fixation for the last-seen
stimulus. Since the last fixation of the trial is to the item in 79% of
trials, we indeed expect there to be∼0.4 fewer price fixations than
item fixations.
FIGURE 6 | Fixation properties. (A)The duration of middle item fixations as
a function of the item value, (B) price, and (C) net value. (D)The duration of
middle price fixations as a function of the product value, (E) price, and (F) net
value. Bars are standard error bars, clustered by subject.
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FIGURE 7 | Item vs. price fixations. (A) Fixation duration as a function of
fixation type: first fixation to item, first fixation to price, middle fixation to
item, middle fixation to price, last fixation to item, and last fixation to price.
Note that “first/last fixation” means the first/last fixation of the trial, not the
first/last fixation to each stimulus. (B) Density plot of the total trial time spent
looking at the item (blue) and price (black). (C)The number of item and price
fixations in a trial, as a function of the magnitude of the net value. Bars are
standard error bars, clustered by subject.
DISCUSSION
We have described the results of an eye-tracking experiment of
purchasing decisions designed to investigate if the aDDM is able
to provide a reasonable quantitative description of the relation-
ship between the fixation, choice, and reaction time data in the
case of simple purchasing decisions. The motivation for doing
this is that in previous work we have found that the model pro-
vides a remarkably accurate description of these variables and
their interrelationship in the case of binary and trinary food
choices (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). Thus,
the research agenda here is to investigate the extent to which the
aDDM also applies to other types of decisions, what changes are
needed to account for new aspects of the task, and more generally
when it breaks down and why.
We find that the model provides a reasonably accurate descrip-
tion of the purchasing decision data, although of significantly
lower accuracy than in our previous work. This shows that pur-
chasing decisions introduce new aspects into the problem that
are not well captured by the simple aDDM and that need to be
investigated in future research (see below for some conjectures).
However, we find that the best-fitting aDDM has parameters sim-
ilar to what we found in our previous work, with the exception
of the parameter controlling the magnitude of the visual fixation
bias in the value integration process. In particular, the bias para-
meter went from θ= 0.3 in our previous work to θ= 0.7 in the
current dataset, which constitutes a sizable reduction in the size
of the fixation-driven choice biases. Nevertheless, many of the key
biases predicted by the model were still present in the purchas-
ing data, albeit of a smaller magnitude than those found in the
previous studies and generally not as big as the model predicted.
Furthermore, once again we found that these effects are not due
to subjects looking longer at products (or less at prices) in trials
with a high net value.
In judging the reduced accuracy of the model it is important
to keep in mind that we are imposing some very strict tests on the
model. First, we are fitting the model on one half of the data and
then predicting on the other half of the data, rather than merely
showing fits to the data. Second, we are fitting the model on only
the choice and reaction time curves (Figures 2A,B). It is quite
likely that we could have achieved nicer results by fitting to the
fixation trends as well (e.g., Figure 4A), but that would detract
from a main feature of the model, which is the ability to predict
fixation trends using only choice and reaction time data.
These results are important for several reasons.
First, they provide additional evidence that the aDDMprovides
a reasonably accurate and robust characterization of how the brain
computes value-based choices of different types.An important dif-
ference with our previous paradigms is that here subjects had to
integrate the value of two very different types of stimuli.
Second, the results provide some new insights to the literature
on decision field theory (DFT) by Busemeyer and others (Buse-
meyer andTownsend, 1993;Diederich, 1997, 2003; Roe et al., 2001;
Busemeyer and Diederich, 2002; Johnson and Busemeyer, 2005;
Tsetsos et al., 2010). See also the closely related models of Usher
andMcClelland (2004) andUsher et al. (2008). Thesemodels have
also investigated the impact that random fluctuations in attention
have on choice accuracy and reaction time. In particular, although
the DFT model has not been previously applied to the type of
simple purchasing decisions studied here, it is easily extended to
this case. Such an extension highlights an important difference
between the twomodels:DFT assumes that attention (and thus the
drift rate) fluctuates continuously across time according to either a
stationary or Markov process, while we assume that there are only
two states of attention and that the current state is indicated by the
subject’s fixation location. This is an important difference because,
as a result, although it can account for the basic choice and reac-
tion time profiles, DFT cannot account for many of the fixation
patterns described here and in our previous work onmulti-option
choice (Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011).
Our model is closer in spirit to multiattribute decision field
theory (MDFT; Diederich, 1997, 2003; Busemeyer and Diederich,
2002) but in that model it is assumed that the attributes are
processed in a serial manner, equivalent to the case of θ= 0 in
our model. Again, that model cannot account for the trends in
our data. For purchasing decisions, our aDDM represents some-
thing like a hybrid between DFT and MDFT, with the additional
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specification that gaze location determines the weights on the
attributes. It is also worth noting that analytic solutions have been
derived for those models, under certain assumptions about the
evolution of the attribute weights.
However, we emphasize that our purpose here is not to rule out
these alternative models and explanations, but to argue that the
aDDM provides a simpler explanation of value-based decision-
making that can quantitatively account for the effects of visual
attention on choice in both purchasing and multi-option deci-
sions. Obviously this simplicity comes at a cost: we do not account
for possible shifts of attention to positive or negative attributes
within a fixation. Instead we assume that evidence for an option is
accumulated with an average rate that is proportional to the latent
value (i.e., the BDM value), which should reflect the mixture of
positive and negative attributes. Shifts of attention to different
attributes within a fixation are therefore only taken into account
by theGaussian randomnoise that is added to the average evidence
accumulation.
Second, the results show that the basic mechanisms at work
in the aDDM also seem to apply to cases in which one of the
options is numeric or symbolic, instead of a more complex visual
stimulus. This is important because it provides some new hints
about the nature of the processes at work. It has been previously
speculated that the process of value integration and comparison
is noisy because the brain needs to take repeated noisy samples
of the value of the stimuli being evaluated, and that visual atten-
tion matters because it guides the sampling process (Busemeyer
and Townsend, 1993; Krajbich et al., 2010; Glockner and Herbold,
2011; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). This is a natural interpreta-
tion for stimuli that are visually complex, but it is not obvious
if the same holds true for numerical price representations. The
results here show that this is indeed the case: although fixations to
prices are shorter and less variable, the results suggest that they are
also integrated noisily over time. This suggests that the process of
noisy dynamic integration of value might be a widespread aspect
of the choice process, and not just applicable to complex visual
stimuli.
To lend further support to this claim, we carried out model
fittings of an additional model that allows for different values of
the visual fixation bias parameter θ, depending on whether the
product or the price is being fixated on. We found that adding
this additional parameter did indeed significantly improve the fit
of the model, but that the best fitted θ for the item was still 0.7,
and the best fitted theta for the price θ changed only slightly to
0.6. This provides further support for the finding that the integra-
tion processes for the product and price information have similar
properties.
Third, the difference between themagnitude of the visual biases
raises the following interesting puzzle: why is it the case then that
the visual bias for the products during the purchasing decisions
is much lower than the bias for the foods during binary choice?
After all, the complexity of the pictures used to display the products
here is very similar to that of the food pictures used in our previous
work. One potential but speculative explanation is that there is a
visual difference in the twodisplays.During binary choice two sim-
ilar food pictures are displayed, while two different types of visual
images – a visually complex food picture and a simple number –
are displayed during purchasing decisions. Looking at one picture
might inhibit working memory for the other picture (including
low-level rehearsal captured by θ) more strongly than looking at
a number, and vice-versa (Baddeley, 2003). The reduced inhibi-
tion in the picture-number paper would bemanifested by a higher
value of θ, just as we infer from the data. If this hypothesis is cor-
rect, then when prices are presented in a complex visual display
(e.g., stacks of money and coins) rather than as a simple num-
ber, we might expect a θ lower than what was measured in this
task.
Fourth, the fact that price fixations were shorter and less vari-
able than those for products is consistent with the idea that the
deployment of visual attention is based on the utility of infor-
mation (Gottlieb and Balan, 2010). An important open question
for future work is to develop and test a full optimal model of
visual attention deployment. Note that this imposes more strin-
gent restrictions on the fixation process than just having shorter
fixations on stimuli that are easier to process, or having less
noise associated with them. One place where the aDDM was
noticeably inaccurate was in the prediction of how the num-
ber of fixations varies with choice difficulty, and so clearly we
need a better understanding of how fixations work in purchasing
decisions.
Fifth, the results have obvious implications for marketing and
public policy. In particular, they show that sellers may be able to
use strategic product and price placement, as well as manipulation
of saliency (Milosavljevic et al., 2012), to encourage consumers to
purchase their products. Also, sellers of inferior productsmay ben-
efit from deliberately putting people under unnaturally high time
pressure (Diederich, 1997). In the aDDM, time pressure creates
a large rate of “mistakes” (choices with a negative net value) that
decreases in longer trials. Indeed, some high-pressure phone and
door-to-door sales tactics could be construed as attempts to bring
a premature halt to a slow DDM process, in order to create large
consumer mistakes that benefit the sellers. The aDDM approach
gives a new way to study this process scientifically and can suggest
policy remedies (e.g., “cooling off periods,” during which buy-
ers can costlessly renege on an agreement to sell; Camerer et al.,
2003).
Of course such manipulations have their limits. Compared to
previous results with multi-option choice, the effects of visual
attention are quite reduced in our purchasing task. Therefore,
if the product under consideration is substantially worse than
its price then the drift rate will always tend toward the “do
not buy” threshold, regardless of what the subject is looking
at. In addition, noticeable attention manipulations such as forc-
ing the subject to look at a product for a long time may alert
the subject and alter the decision-making process. Neverthe-
less, previous research has shown that it is indeed possible to
influence choices by exogenously manipulating fixation times
(Shimojo et al., 2003; Armel et al., 2008), consistent with the
idea that visual fixations are influencing the choices and not
vice-versa.
Finally, the study provides additional evidence of the value of
utilizing eye-tracking data in conjunction with carefully designed
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decision tasks to test process models of decision-making. In
this sense, it builds on the seminal pioneering work of John-
son and colleagues (Johnson et al., 1988, 2002, 2007; Camerer
and Johnson, 2004), as well as more recent applications (Russo
et al., 2006, 2008; Raab and Johnson, 2007; Horstmann et al.,
2009; Glockner and Herbold, 2011; Russo and Yong, 2011; Glock-
ner et al., 2012). For an outstanding recent review, see Russo
(2010).
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APPENDIX
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FIGUREA1 | Histogram of the bids for the various products in the BDM task, using all the data.
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FIGUREA2 | Continued
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FIGUREA2 | Continued
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FIGUREA2 | Replication of all the figures from the text but including the $0 products.
FIGUREA3 | Replication of Figures 2A,B choice and reaction time curves but using all of the data, including the $0 bids and net values beyond +/−$20.
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FIGUREA4 | Replication of Figures 3A,B, and 4A but using both the even and odd-numbered trials.
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